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Dealing with Separatism Conflict in Indonesia: Examining an Interactive Model of Conflict De-escalation and Resolution

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APPENDIX III

Supplementary information (Chapter 4)

Table 4.2

Correlation among Observed Variables of the Current Study

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Separation legitimacy	2.80	.78	–	-.14**	-.06	.13**	.30**	.05	.13**	-.03	.04	.22**	.07	.001
2. Integration legitimacy	4.24	.60		–	.01	.01	-.04	-.14**	.20**	.40**	.35**	.30**	.33**	.21**
3. Ingroup action (rightdoings = 0, wrongdoings = 1)	.51	.50			–	-.01	.28**	-.05	.13**	-.047	.020	.01	-.07	.001
4. Competitive victimhood	3.05	.81				–	.20**	.26**	.19**	-.01	-.02	.07	.002	-.07
5. Perpetratorhood	2.93	.83					–	.09	.36**	.06	.08	.28**	.10*	.09*
6. Moral licensing	2.13	.82						–	-.08	-.29**	-.18**	-.08	-.13**	-.15**
7. Morality threat	3.75	.84							–	.38**	.29**	.23**	.14**	.12**
8. Need for social acceptance	4.21	.65								–	.52**	.36**	.35**	.28**
9. Need for restoration of moral image	4.12	.68									–	.42**	.32**	.27**
10. Intergroup trust	3.82	.58										–	.63**	.59**
11. Positive attitudes	3.71	.71											–	.71**
12. Positive stereotypes	3.54	.74												–

Note: M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 4.3

Correlations among Latent Variables of the Current Study

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Ingroup action (rightdoings = 0, wrongdoings = 1)	-	-.01	.22**	.004	.04	-.04	-.01
2. Competitive victimhood		-	.30**	.35**	.23**	-.02	.03
3. Perpetratorhood			-	.16**	.44**	.09*	.22**
4. Moral licensing				-	-.17**	-.35**	-.15**
5. Morality threat					-	.48**	.27**
6. Compensatory needs						-	..52**
7. Reconciliatory attitudes							-

Note: * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. All measures were transformed into a latent variable, except for ingroup action that was retained as an observed variable.

RECONCILIATION IN SEPARATIST CONFLICT

APPENDIX III

Table 4.4
Empirical Results of Structural Parameters Across-Parcelling Models

Structural Parameters	Parcelling Models					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
$\beta_{11}(SE)(p)$	-.01 (.04) (.794)	-.01 (.04) (.791)	-.01 (.04) (.811)	-.04 (.04) (.286)	-.04 (.04) (.286)	-.04 (.04) (.306)
$\beta_{12}(SE)(p)$.20 (.04) (.000)	.20 (.04) (.000)	.13 (.05) (.009)	.21 (.05) (.000)	.21 (.05) (.000)	.21 (.05) (.000)
$\beta_2(SE)(p)$.33 (.06) (.000)	.33 (.06) (.000)	.33 (.06) (.000)	.36 (.05) (.000)	.36 (.05) (.000)	.36 (.05) (.000)
$\beta_{31}(SE)(p)$.40 (.06) (.000)	.40 (.06) (.000)	.35 (.05) (.000)	.41 (.05) (.000)	.41 (.05) (.000)	.41 (.05) (.000)
$\beta_{32}(SE)(p)$.16 (.05) (.001)	.15 (.05) (.001)	.16 (.04) (.000)	.15 (.05) (.001)	.15 (.05) (.001)	.19 (.05) (.000)
$\beta_4(SE)(p)$	-.25 (.05) (.000)	-.24 (.05) (.000)	-.24 (.05) (.000)	-.27 (.05) (.000)	-.25 (.05) (.000)	-.25 (.05) (.000)
$\beta_5(SE)(p)$.39 (.05) (.000)	.39 (.05) (.000)	.39 (.05) (.000)	.38 (.05) (.000)	.38 (.05) (.000)	.38 (.05) (.000)
$\beta_6(SE)(p)$.47 (.04) (.000)	.48 (.04) (.000)	.48 (.04) (.000)	.47 (.04) (.000)	.48 (.04) (.000)	.49 (.04) (.000)
$\beta_7(SE)(p)$.08 (.02) (.000)	.08 (.02) (.000)	.05 (.02) (.011)	.08 (.02) (.000)	.08 (.02) (.000)	.08 (.02) (.000)
$\beta_8(SE)(p)$	-.004 (.01) (.794)	-.004 (.01) (.791)	-.003 (.01) (.810)	-.02 (.01) (.285)	-.02 (.02) (.288)	-.02 (.02) (.307)
$\beta_9(SE)(p)$.18 (.03) (.000)	.19 (.03) (.000)	.19 (.03) (.000)	.18 (.03) (.000)	.18 (.03) (.000)	.18 (.03) (.000)
$\beta_{10}(SE)(p)$	-.12 (.03) (.000)	-.11 (.03) (.000)	-.12 (.03) (.000)	-.13 (.03) (.000)	-.12 (.03) (.000)	-.12 (.03) (.000)
$\chi^2(df)$	158.706 (95)	166.689 (95)	138.053 (95)	160.181 (95)	158.321 (95)	143.981 (95)
RMSEA (90% CI)	.037 (.026, .046)	.039 (.029, .048)	.030 (.018, .041)	.037 (.027, .047)	.036 (.026, .046)	.032 (.021, .042)
CFI	.98	.98	.99	.98	.98	.99
TLI	.98	.97	.99	.98	.98	.98

Table 4.4 (continued)

Empirical Results of Structural Parameters Across-Parcelling Models

Structural Parameters	Parcelling Models			Average Model		
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	M_β	SD_β	Power
$\beta_{11} (SE) (p)$	-.03 (.04) (.521)	-.03 (.04) (.515)	-.03 (.04) (.536)	-.03	.01	.001
$\beta_{12} (SE) (p)$.19 (.05) (.000)	.19 (.04) (.000)	.19 (.05) (.000)	.19	.02	1.000
$\beta_2 (SE) (p)$.34 (.06) (.000)	.34 (.06) (.000)	.34 (.06) (.000)	.34	.01	1.000
$\beta_{31} (SE) (p)$.42 (.05) (.000)	.42 (.05) (.000)	.42 (.05) (.000)	.40	.02	1.000
$\beta_{32} (SE) (p)$.17 (.05) (.001)	.16 (.05) (.001)	.16 (.05) (.001)	.16	.01	1.000
$\beta_4 (SE) (p)$	-.27 (.05) (.000)	-.25 (.05) (.000)	-.25 (.05) (.000)	-.25	.01	1.000
$\beta_5 (SE) (p)$.39 (.05) (.000)	.39 (.05) (.000)	.42 (.05) (.000)	.39	.01	1.000
$\beta_6 (SE) (p)$.47 (.04) (.000)	.48 (.04) (.000)	.48 (.04) (.000)	.48	.01	1.000
$\beta_7 (SE) (p)$.08 (.02) (.000)	.08 (.02) (.000)	.08 (.02) (.000)	.10	.07	.89
$\beta_8 (SE) (p)$	-.01 (.01) (.519)	-.01 (.01) (.515)	-.01 (.01) (.534)	-.01	.01	.001
$\beta_9 (SE) (p)$.19 (.03) (.000)	.19 (.03) (.000)	.19 (.03) (.000)	.18	.02	.89
$\beta_{10} (SE) (p)$	-.13 (.03) (.000)	-.12 (.03) (.000)	-.12 (.03) (.000)	-.12	.01	.89
$\chi^2 (df)$	158.265 (95)	158.310 (95)	134.335 (95)	152.982 (95)	10.59	
RMSEA (90% CI)	.036 (.026, .046)	.036 (.026, .046)	.029 (.016, .039)	.035	.003	
CFI	.98	.98	.99	.98	.003	
TLI	.97	.98	.98	.98	.004	

Note. β_{11} = The path from ingroup action to victimhood. β_{12} = The path from ingroup action to perpetratorhood. β_2 = The path from victimhood to moral licensing. β_{31} = The path from perpetratorhood to morality threat. β_{32} = The path from perpetratorhood to reconciliatory attitudes. β_4 = The path from moral licensing to compensatory needs. β_5 = The path from morality threat to compensatory needs. β_6 = The path from compensatory needs to reconciliatory attitudes. β_7 = The effect of ingroup action to morality threat via perpetratorhood. β_8 = The effect of ingroup action to moral licensing via competitive victimhood. β_9 = The effect of morality threat to reconciliatory attitudes via compensatory needs. β_{10} = The effect of moral licensing to reconciliatory attitudes via compensatory needs. Model 1 = Item-to-construct balance for unidimensional constructs, item numbering for multidimensional constructs. Model 2 = Item-to-construct balance for unidimensional and multidimensional constructs. Model 3 = Item-to-construct balance for unidimensional constructs, random group assignment without replacement for multidimensional constructs. Model 4 = Simple randomisation without replacement for unidimensional constructs, item numbering for multidimensional constructs. Model 5 = Simple randomisation without replacement for unidimensional constructs, item-to-construct balance for multidimensional constructs. Model 6 = Simple randomisation without replacement for unidimensional constructs, random group assignment without replacement for multidimensional constructs. Model 7 = Correlations for unidimensional constructs, item numbering for multidimensional constructs. Model 8 = Correlations for unidimensional constructs, item-to-construct balance for multidimensional constructs. Model 9 = Correlations for unidimensional constructs, random group assignment without replacement for multidimensional constructs. Average Model = The parcelling model that was derived from Monte Carlo simulation of all nine parcelling models. *SE* = Standard error. *SD* = Standard deviation. *p* = Two-tailed significance. χ^2 = Chi-square. *df* = Degree of freedom. RMSEA = Root mean square error approximation. CFI = Comparative fit index. TLI = Tucker-Lewis index.

Table 4.5
Empirical Results of the Moderation Analyses across Various Parcelling Models

Parcelling Models	Structural parameters					
	Integration legitimacy			Separation legitimacy		
	Low β (SE) (p)	High β (SE) (p)	Wald Test Value (df) (p)	Low β (SE) (p)	High β (SE) (p)	Wald Test Value (df) (p)
Model 1	.27 (.07) (.000)	.03 (.06) (.566)	7.195 (1) (.007)	.02 (.07) (.734)	.30 (.06) (.000)	9.194 (1) (.002)
Model 2	.25 (.07) (.000)	.04 (.06) (.472)	6.264 (1) (.012)	.01 (.07) (.890)	.29 (.06) (.000)	9.893 (1) (.002)
Model 3	.26 (.07) (.000)	.03 (.06) (.610)	6.885 (1) (.009)	.01 (.07) (.891)	.29 (.06) (.000)	9.803 (1) (.002)
Model 4	.25 (.06) (.000)	.04 (.06) (.541)	6.328 (1) (.012)	-.01 (.07) (.934)	.29 (.06) (.000)	11.149 (1) (.001)
Model 5	.23 (.06) (.000)	.05 (.06) (.462)	5.447 (1) (.020)	-.02 (.07) (.828)	.29 (.06) (.000)	11.374 (1) (.001)
Model 6	.24 (.06) (.000)	.04 (.07) (.568)	5.903 (1) (.015)	-.01 (.07) (.829)	.29 (.06) (.000)	11.223 (1) (.001)
Model 7	.28 (.07) (.000)	.06 (.07) (.328)	6.114 (1) (.013)	.04 (.08) (.605)	.31 (.07) (.000)	7.658 (1) (.006)
Model 8	.27 (.07) (.000)	.07 (.07) (.285)	5.309 (1) (.021)	.03 (.08) (.727)	.30 (.07) (.000)	8.167 (1) (.004)
Model 9	.28 (.07) (.000)	.06 (.07) (.371)	5.841 (1) (.016)	.03 (.07) (.741)	.30 (.07) (.000)	8.141 (1) (.004)
Average Model	.26 (.07) (.000)	.05 (.06) (.467)	6.143 (1) (.014)	.01 (.07) (.798)	.30 (.06) (.000)	9.622 (1) (.003)

Note: β = Standardised coefficient of the path from perpetratorhood to reconciliatory attitudes. SE = Standard error. df = Degree of freedom. p = Two-tailed significance. Model 1 = Item-to-construct balance for unidimensional constructs, item numbering for multidimensional constructs. Model 2 = Item-to-construct balance for unidimensional and multidimensional constructs. Model 3 = Item-to-construct balance for unidimensional constructs, random group assignment without replacement for multidimensional constructs. Model 4 = Simple randomisation without replacement for unidimensional constructs, item numbering for multidimensional constructs. Model 5 = Simple randomisation without replacement for unidimensional constructs, item-to-construct balance for multidimensional constructs. Model 6 = Simple randomisation without replacement for unidimensional constructs, random group assignment without replacement for multidimensional constructs. Model 7 = Correlations for unidimensional constructs, item numbering for multidimensional constructs. Model 8 = Correlations for unidimensional constructs, item-to-construct balance for multidimensional constructs. Model 9 = Correlations for unidimensional constructs, random group assignment without replacement for multidimensional constructs. Average Model = The parcelling model that was derived from Monte Carlo simulation of all nine parcelling models.